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Abstract Social norms serve as an important mechanism to regulate the be-
haviors of agents and to facilitate coordination among them in multiagent
systems. One important research question is how a norm can rapidly emerge
through repeated local interaction within an agent society under different envi-
ronments when their coordination space becomes large. To address this prob-
lem, we propose a Hierarchically Heuristic Learning Strategy (HHLS) under
the hierarchical social learning framework, in which subordinate agents report
their information to their supervisors, while supervisors can generate instruc-
tions (rules and suggestions) based on the information collected from their
subordinates. Subordinate agents heuristically update their strategies based
on both their own experience and the instructions from their supervisors. Ex-
tensive experiment evaluations show that HHLS can support the emergence of
desirable social norms more efficiently and is applicable in a much wider range
of multiagent interaction scenarios compared with previous work. We also in-
vestigate the effectiveness of HHLS by separating out the different components
of the HHLS and evaluating the relative importance of those components. The
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influence of key related factors (e.g., hierarchical factors, non-hierarchical fac-
tors, fixed-strategy agents) are investigated as well.
Keywords Norm emergence · Multiagent social learning · Multiagent
hierarchical learning
1 Introduction
Social norms play an important role in regulating agents’ behaviors to ensure
coordination among agents and functioning of agent societies. One commonly
adopted characterization of a norm is to model it as a consistent equilibrium
that all agents follow during interactions where multiple equivalent equilibria
coexist [34]. How social norms can emerge efficiently in agent societies is a key
research problem in the area of normative multiagent systems.
There exist two major approaches for addressing norm emergence problem:
the top-down [2,26] approach and the bottom-up approach [24,38]. The former
approach investigates how to efficiently synthesize a norm for all agents be-
forehand, while the latter one investigates how a norm can emerge through re-
peated local interactions. In distributed multiagent interaction environments,
it is usually difficult to design a norm a priori, and before agents interact,
since a centralized controller might not exist and due to the fact that the
optimal norm may vary frequently as the environment dynamically changes
and therefore, the bottom-up approach of emergent norms via local interac-
tions promises to be more suitable for such kinds of distributed and dynamic
environments.
Until now, significant efforts have been devoted to investigating norm emer-
gence problem from the bottom-up approaches [3,11,38,4,17,12,39,13,19,23,
24,25,28,29,30,35,36,37]. Sen and Airiau [24] investigated the norm emer-
gence problem in a population of agents within randomly connected networks
where each agent is equipped with certain multiagent learning algorithms. The
local interaction among each pair of agents is modeled as two-player normal-
form games, and a norm corresponds to one consistent Nash equilibrium of the
coordination/anti-coordination game. Later, a number of papers [19,30,22,3]
subsequently extended this work by using more realistic and complex networks
(e.g., small-world network and scale-free network) to model the diverse inter-
action patterns among agents. Additionally, different learning strategies and
mechanisms have been proposed to better facilitate norm emergence among
agents within different interaction environments [39,21,17,4,12,36].
Most of the previous works only focus on games of relatively small size.
This simplification does not accurately reflect the practical interaction sce-
narios where the action space of agents can be quite large. With the increase
of action space, most of the existing approaches usually result in very slow
norm emergence or even fail to converge. Recently, Yu et al. [35] proposed a
hierarchical learning strategy to improve the norm emergence rate for very
large action space problems. However, this work only considers the case in
which a norm corresponds to a Nash equilibrium where the interacting agents
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Table 1 An example of coordination game.
Agent 2’s actions
a b
Agent 1’s
actions
a 1 -1
b -1 1
Table 2 An example of anti-coordination game.
Agent 2’s actions
a b
Agent 1’s
actions
a -1 1
b 1 -1
select the same action. This usually can be modelled as a two-player n-action
coordination game (CG). One simple example with n=2 is shown in Table 1.
However, in realistic interaction scenarios, a norm may correspond to a Nash
equilibrium where all agents select different actions. One notable example is
considering two drivers arriving at a road intersection from two neighboring
roads. To avoid collision, one possible norm is “yield to the left”, i.e., waiting
for the car on the left-hand side to go through the intersection first. This kind
of scenario can naturally be modeled as an anti-coordination game (ACG), as
shown in Table 2, which exist two different norms, i.e., (a, b) and (b, a).
Furthermore, agents may be faced with the challenge of high mis-coordination
cost and stochasticity of the environment. One representative example is shown
in Table 3, which we call fully stochastic coordination game with high penalty
(FSCGHP). In this game, there exist two optimal Nash equilibria marked with
red each of which corresponds to a norm, and one suboptimal Nash equilib-
rium marked with blue. Two major challenges coexist in this game: agents are
vulnerable to converge to the suboptimal Nash equilibrium due to the high
penalty when agents mis-coordinate on the outcomes; agents need to effectively
distinguish between the stochasticity of the environment and the exploration
of other learners. It is not clear, a priori, how a population of agents can ef-
ficiently evolve towards a consistent norm, given the large space of possible
norms in such challenging environments.
To answer this question, in this paper we propose a novel Hierarchical
Heuristic Learning Strategy (HHLS) under the hierarchical social learning
framework to facilitate rapid norm emergence in agent societies. In the hierar-
chical social learning framework, the agent society is separated into a number
of clusters, each of which consists of several subordinate agents. Each cluster’s
strategies are monitored and guided by one supervisor agent. In each round,
each supervisor agent collects the interaction information of its subordinate
agents and generates instructions in the forms of behavioral rules and sugges-
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Table 3 Fully stochastic coordination game with high penalty.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
a b c
Agent 1’s
actions
a 8/12 -5/5 -20/-40
b -5/5 0/14 -5/5
c -20/-40 -5/5 8/12
tions for its subordinates. On the other hand, each subordinate agent, apart
from learning from its local interaction, also adjusts its strategy based on the
instructions from its supervisor. The main feature of the proposed framework
is that through hierarchical supervision among agents, an effective compromise
solution can be generated to effectively balance distributed interactions and
centralized control towards efficient and robust norm emergence.
We evaluate the performance of HHLS under a wide range of games and
experimental results show that HHLS can facilitate rapid emergence of norms
compared with the state-of-the-art approaches. We investigate the influence of
hierarchical (e.g., the cluster size, different grouping mechanisms, the number
of disabling supervisors) and non-hierarchical factors (e.g., the population size,
the size of action space, different network topologies, the neighborhood size) on
norm emergence. Lastly, we investigate the influence of fixed-strategy agents
on norm emergence (e.g., initial and late intervention, different placement
strategies) and norm emergence in isolated sub-networks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses
related work. Section 3 introduces the hierarchical social learning framework
and the heuristic learning strategy. Section 4 presents experimental evaluation
results compared with two representative state-of-the-art approaches. Finally,
Section 5 concludes the paper and points out future directions.
2 Related Work
2.1 Norm Emergence
Norm emergence problem has received a wide range of attention in Multiagent
Systems (MASs) literature. Shoham and Tennenholtz [25] first investigated the
norm emergence problem in an agent society based on a simple and natural
strategy - the Highest Cumulative Reward (HCR). In this study, they showed
that HCR achieved high efficiency on social conventions in a class of games. Sen
and Airiau [24] investigated the norm emergence problem in MASs where each
agent is equipped with certain existing multiagent learning algorithms. They
firstly proposed the model of social learning, where each agent learns from
repeated interactions with multiple agents in a given scenario. In this study, the
local interaction among each pair of agents is modeled as two-player normal-
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form games, and a norm corresponds to one consistent Nash equilibrium of the
game. Later, a number of papers [19,30,23,3] extended this work by leveraging
more realistic and complex networks (e.g., small-world network and scale-free
network) to model the interaction patterns among agents and evaluated the
influence of heterogeneous agent systems and space-constrained interactions
on norm emergence. Savarimuthu [21] recapped the existing mechanisms on
the multiagent-based emergence, and investigated the role of three proactive
learning methods in accelerating norm emergence. The influence of liars on
norm emergence is also considered and simulation results showed that norm
emergence can still be sustained in the presence of liars.
Villatoro et al. [30] proposed a reward learning mechanism based on in-
teraction history. In this study, they investigated the influence of different
network topologies and the effects of memory of past activities on convention
emergence. Later, they [28,29] introduced two rules (i.e., re-wiring links with
neighbors and observation) to overcome the suboptimal norm problems. They
investigated the influence of Self-Reinforcing Substructure (SRS) in the net-
work on impeding full convergence towards society-wide norms, which usually
results in reduced convergence rates. Hao et al. [11] investigated the prob-
lem of coordinating towards optimal joint actions in cooperative games under
the social learning framework by introducing two types of learners (IALs and
JALs). Yu et al. [38] proposed a novel collective learning framework to inves-
tigate the influence of agent local collective behaviors on norm emergence in
different scenarios and defined two strategies (collective learning-l and collec-
tive learning-g) to promote the emergence of norms where agents are allowed
to make collective decisions within networked societies. Later, Hao et al. [12]
proposed two learning strategies under the collective learning framework: col-
lective learning EV-l and collective learning EV-g to address the problem of
high mis-coordination cost and stochasticity in complex and dynamic inter-
action scenarios. More recently, Yu et al. [36] proposed an adaptive learning
framework for efficient norm emergence. Later, Yu et al. [37] proposed a novel
adaptive learning to facilitate consensus formation among agents, in order to
efficiently establish a consistent social norm in agent societies. However, all the
aforementioned works usually focus on relatively small-size games, and do not
address the issue of efficient norm emergence in large action space problems.
Hierarchical learning framework, as a promising solution to accelerate co-
ordination among agents, has been studied in different multiagent applications
(e.g., package routing [39], traffic control [1], p2p network [18] and smart-grid
[33]). For example, Zhang et al. [39,40] studied the package routing prob-
lem and proposed a multi-level organizational structure for automated su-
pervision and a communication protocol for information exchange between
higher-level supervising agents and their subordinate agents. Simulation shows
that the organization-based control framework can significantly increase the
overall package routing efficiency compared to traditional non-hierarchical ap-
proaches. Abdoos et al. [1] proposed a multi-layer organizational controlling
framework to model large traffic networks to improve the coordination between
different car agents and improve the overall traffic efficiency. Recently, Yu et
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al. [35] proposed a hierarchical learning framework to study the norm emer-
gence problem. In this study, they proposed a two-level hierarchical framework.
Agents in the lower level interact with each other and report information to
their supervisors in the higher level, while agents in the higher level called
supervisors pass down guidance to the lower level. Agents in the lower level
follow guidance in policy update. However, their framework is designed for
coordination game only, where agents only need to coordinate to select the
same action for effective norm emergence.
2.2 Fixed-strategy Agents on Norm Emergence
Given the existence of multiple norms, agents usually do not have preference
over different norms. It has been found that fixed-strategy agents could play a
critical role in influencing the direction of norm emergence and have received
wide range of attention in previous work [24,16,6,10]. Fixed-strategy agents
are those who always select the same action regardless of its efficiency or others’
choices. Previous work has shown that inserting relatively small numbers of
fixed-strategy agents can significantly influence much larger populations when
placed in networked social learning framework.
Sen and Airiau [24,3] firstly investigated the effect of fixed-strategy agents
in affecting norm adoption in social learning framework. Griffiths and Anand
[10] proposed a social learning model where each agent has a fixed length of
memory recording the most recent actions it has selected. They demonstrated
how fixed-strategy agents can manipulate emergence and evaluated strategies
for inserting fixed-strategy agents using placement heuristics such as degree
and betweenness centrality. Marchant et al. [16] investigated the influence of
fixed-strategy agents on norm emergence in a dynamic network. They defined
a new heuristic and proposed late intervention of fixed-strategy agents, where
the whole system has already emerged an existing norm. Experimental results
show that placing small numbers of fixed-strategy agents can disrupt the al-
ready established norm and the whole population eventually converged to the
norm adopted by the fixed-strategy agents. Tiwari et al. [27] investigated the
effect of leader placement in simulated robotic swarms. Their experimental
results showed that the leader placement strategy determines the time it takes
for the swarm to converge: leaders placed in the middle or periphery of the
swarm are better in maneuvering the swarm than leaders placed in the front.
Franks et al. [6] first introduced Influencer Agents (IAs) as a mechanism
to manipulate norm emergence direction. The IAs can be considered as agents
with uniform levels strategies and goals to aid the emergence of high quality
norms in domains characterized by heterogeneous ownership and uniform levels
of agent authority. IAs are those agents with specific norms (fixed strategies),
such that the whole population, through their rational selection of actions, is
guided towards the adoption of the specific norms. They evaluated the influ-
ence of IAs in the language coordination problem domain. Results showed that
small number of IAs can effectively manipulate the emergence of high-quality
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conventions. On the other hand, they proved the fragility of convention emer-
gence in the presence of malicious or faulty agents that attempted to propagate
low quality conventions, and confirmed the importance of network topologies
in norm adoption. Franks et al. [5] later proposed a methodology for learning
the influence of the placement of agents in a network and evaluated their ap-
proach in the context of the language coordination domain. They investigated
the influence of IAs in a coordination game with heterogeneous agent learning
mechanisms. They used several topological metrics to measure the influence
of fixed-strategy agents on norm emergence. Experimental results showed that
when placing agents following their methodology, agents can gain much higher
influence power than random placement.
Another notable work related with fixed-strategy agents is by Genter et al.
[9] which investigates the influence of placing fixed-strategy agents in a flock
of agents. The group flocking behavior emerges from simple local control rules,
through which each individual agent adjusts its own trajectory based on those
of its neighbors. They defined several methodologies for placing the influencing
agents into the flock. Experimental results showed that the graph approach
outperforms other approaches when initially placing influencing agents any-
where into the flock and the grid approach performs best when the agents must
travel to their desired positions after being initially placed outside the flock.
Later, Genter and Stone [7] extended their work on considering the placement
heuristic of influencing agents in a flock and how influencing agents should
behave in order to join a flock in motion (i.e., the joining case). They showed
that the placement heuristics of fixed-strategy agents which work well for ini-
tial placement also work well if fixed-strategy agents can place themselves in
an incoming flock within the flight path. Recently, they [8] considered the
situation where robot birds are deployed to influence flocks in nature. They
proposed a hover approach for robot birds to use when joining and leaving a
flock. Finally, they summarized and pointed out the main drawback of their
hover approach: the robot birds are required to hover at desired positions. This
may cause hovering problems because robot birds would be unable to hover
when they are recognized by natural birds as ‘one of their own’.
3 Hierarchical Social Learning Framework
3.1 Framework Overview
We consider a population of N agents where each agent is connected by the
underlying network topology. In each round, each agent interacts with one ran-
domly selected agent from its neighborhood. An agent’s neighborhood consists
of all agents that are physically connected. We model the interaction between
each pair of agents as a normal-form game. At the beginning of each interac-
tion, one agent is randomly assigned as the row player and the other as the
column player. We assume that each agent is unaware of opponent’s action
and payoff information and can only have access to its own action and pay-
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Fig. 1 An example of the two-level hierarchical network.
off information during interaction. The population of agents are divided into
multiple levels, and the agents in each level supervise the behaviors of agents
in its neighboring lower level.
One example of two-level hierarchical network is shown in Fig 1. Each su-
pervisor agent i in the higher level is in charge of a group of subordinate agents
(denoted as sub(i)) in the bottom level surrounded by dashes lines. For each
subordinate agent j, its supervisor agent is denoted as sup(j). For subordi-
nates, the topological connections between them are determined by the original
network topology; for supervisors, a pair of supervisors are neighboring agents
if the corresponding group of subordinates they supervise are connected. Note
that each supervisor agent is also allowed to communicate with its neighboring
supervisor agents. The way of dividing subordinates into groups and choosing
each group’s supervisor will be discussed in details in Section 3.2.
The interaction protocol of agents under the hierarchical social learning
framework is summarized in Algorithm 1. In each round, each agent is paired
with another agent randomly selected from its neighborhood (Line 3), and
their roles are randomly assigned (Line 4). Each agent then chooses an action
following its learning strategy (Line 5), and then updates its strategy based
on its current-round feedback (Line 6). After that, each subordinate agent
reports its action and reward information to its supervisor (Line 7-9). At the
end of each round, each supervisor collects all subordinate agents’ information,
generates and issues the instructions to its subordinate agents (Line 12-14).
Finally, each subordinate agent updates its strategy based on the instructions
accordingly (Line 15-17).
3.2 Grouping Mechanism
As described in Section 3.1, the whole population is divided into two levels.
Each agent in the higher level supervises a group of subordinate agents in the
lower level. Each supervisor has a dual role in the network. One role is as
a supervisor of a group of subordinates and the other role is a subordinate
agent which is also allowed to interact with one of its neighbors. How to group
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Algorithm 1 The interaction protocol of the hierarchical framework.
1: for each round of interaction do
2: for each agent i ∈ N do
3: Randomly choose a neighboring agent j to interact;
4: Assign distinct roles randomly i → state si, j → state sj
5: Select actions ai and aj and get rewards ri and rj ;
6: Update its strategy based on 〈si, ai, ri〉.
7: if agent i is a subordinate agent then
8: Reporting its experience 〈si, ai, ri〉 to sup(i);
9: end if
10: end for
11: for each supervisor agent j do
12: Generate instructions based on the information from sub(j);
13: Provide the instructions to sub(j);
14: end for
15: for each subordinate agent k do
16: Update its strategy based on the instructions from sup(k);
17: end for
18: end for
subordinate agents and how to choose supervisors are two key aspects that
can influence the performance of our algorithm. One natural way is to allow
each supervisor to supervise its direct neighbors, which, however, may not be
effective due to the sparsity of network topologies. To this end, we propose a
number of grouping mechanisms as follows.
– Random Grouping
We divide subordinate agents equally into k groups randomly. The super-
visors are also selected randomly from each group. This grouping mechanism
is used in our previous work [32].
– Degree Grouping
Given any network topology G〈V,E〉, each agent i corresponds to a node
vi ∈ V , N (vi) denotes the set of neighbors of the agent i, and the degree of
agent i is |N (vi) |. We divided subordinate agents into different groups based
on their degrees. Agents with the same degree are allocated into the same
group. Also, the supervisors are randomly selected from each group. Note that
degree grouping is not an equally division.
– K-means Grouping
We introduce the core idea of K-means clustering algorithm into our group-
ing mechanism [15]. In a network G〈V,E〉, we define the distance Disspl(vi, vj)
between two agents i, j in such network as the shortest path between them
(i.e. the minimum number of edges connecting these two agents). We first
randomly select k agents as the k centering points. Each of the remaining
agents is assigned to a group if the distance between it and this center point
is minimum over the k centering points (random assignment in case of a tie).
The centering agent of each group is recomputed after all agents have been
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assigned to one group. This process repeats until each agent no longer changes
its group. The final centering agent of each group is selected as the supervisor
of the group. Note that K-means grouping is also not an equal division and
it may lead to extreme cases where some groups have too small number of
agents, which causes undesirable results.
To address this issue, we modify the original K-means grouping to suit
our problem domain in which all groups make some adjustments after the
original K-means algorithm terminates. We adopt a threshold as the maximum
distance between the centering agent and other agents in each group. Agents
will be reassigned to other groups if the distance between it and the centering
point is larger than the given threshold. Moreover, to prevent a group from
being too small, a group will no longer compete for agents if the number of
agents in the group size exceeds a maximum threshold.
– Kernighan-Lin Grouping
The Kernighan-Lin algorithm is a heuristic algorithm for the graph par-
titioning problem [14]. Subordinate agents are first divided into two equal
groups randomly. The sum of the costs of edges between node vi ∈ V and
other nodes within the same group is denoted as the internal cost of node
vi ∈ V , and the sum of the costs of edges between node vi ∈ V and nodes
in opposite group is denoted as the external cost of node vi ∈ V . Each agent
makes an exchange from one group to the other if the exchange reduces the
internal cost and increases the external cost. Kernighan-Lin Grouping ends if
no further exchanges are feasible. Each group will be divided into two equal
groups to repeat the process described above if we need two more groups. An
agent is selected as the supervisor if its degree is the highest in the group.
3.3 Information Exchange between Supervisors and Subordinates
In the hierarchical social learning framework, subordinate agents send their
feedback information to their corresponding supervisors, while supervisors pass
down instructions to their corresponding subordinate agents. In details, each
subordinate agent i reports its current-round interaction experience 〈si, ai, ri〉
to its supervisor sup(i). For supervisors, we distinguish two different forms
of instructions that they can provide to their subordinates: suggestion and
rule [39]. Intuitively, a rule is a hard constraint that specifies an action that
subordinate agents are forbidden to select under certain state in the next
round; in contrast, a suggestion is a soft constraint which indirectly affects
the strategies of the subordinate agents next round.
A set F of rules consists of all the forbidden actions for subordinates under
different states. Formally we have,
F = {〈s, a〉|a ∈ A, s ∈ S} (1)
where each element 〈s, a〉 denotes that action a is forbidden to take in state s;
A and S are the action space and state space of the subordinates respectively.
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A set D of suggestions specifies the recommendation degrees for different
state-action pairs, which can be formally represented as follows,
D = {〈s, a, d(s, a)〉|a ∈ A, s ∈ S} (2)
where d(s, a) is the recommendation degree of action a under state s. Given
an action and a state 〈s, a〉, if d(s, a) < 0, it indicates that action a is not
recommended for selection in state s; if d(s, a) > 0, it indicates subordinate
agents are encouraged to select action a when they are in state s. The way of
determining rules and suggestions will be covered in detail in Section 3.4.2.
freq(s, a) =
|{〈sk, ak, rk〉 | 〈sk, ak, rk〉 ∈ RepInf, sk = s, ak = a, rk = rmax(s, a)}|
|{〈sk, ak, rk〉 | 〈sk, ak, rk〉 ∈ RepInf, sk = s, ak = a}|
(3)
3.4 Learning Strategy
In this section, we first present the learning strategy of supervisors and how
the rules and suggestions are generated in Section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 respectively.
Following that, we describe the learning strategy of subordinate agents and
how they utilize the instructions from supervisors in Section 3.4.3. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that there is a set S of supervisors, and each
supervisor i ∈ S, it supervises the set sub(i) of subordinate agents. Each
subordinate agent j has a set neigh(j) of neighbors, and each supervisor agent
i communicates with a set com(i) of other supervisors.
3.4.1 Supervisor’s Strategy
We propose that each supervisor i holds a Q-value Qi(s, a) for each action a
under each state s (row or column player). Let us denote the set of informa-
tion from its subordinates as RepInfi = {〈sk, ak, rk〉 | k ∈ sub(i)}. For each
piece of information 〈s, a, r〉 ∈ RepInfi, supervisor agent i updates its Q-value
following the optimistic assumption shown in Equation (4),
Qi(s, a) = (1− αi) ∗Qi(s, a) + αi ∗ r (4)
where αi is its learning rate reflecting its updating degree between using the
past experience and using the current round information.
After that, supervisor i further updates its Q-values based on optimistic
assumption and the frequency information of each action similar to the FMQ
heuristic [13]. Formally we have,
FMQi(s, a) = Qi(s, a) + freq(s, a) ∗ rmax(s, a) ∗ C (5)
where rmax(s, a) is the max reward of each action a, freq(s, a) is the frequency
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of receiving the reward of rmax(s, a) by choosing action a under state s and
C is a weighting factor.
The value of rmax(s, a) is obtained from the reported information of its
subordinate agents sub(i). Specifically, The value of rmax(s, a) is computed
as the maximum reward that all of its subordinates receives under state s by
choosing action a in the current round experience. Formally we have,
R(s, a) = {rk | 〈s, a, rk〉 ∈ RefInf} (6)
rmax(s, a) = max{R(s, a)} (7)
The frequency information freq(s, a) is calculated as the empirical proba-
bility of receiving the maximum reward rmax(s, a) under state s when action
a is selected based on the reported information RepInf collected from the
subordinates which is shown in Equation (3).
After updating the strategy based on the information collected from its
subordinates, we also allow each supervisor to learn from its neighboring peers
(supervisors). Specifically, each supervisor communicates with a neighboring
supervisor selected based on the neighboring degree between them and im-
itates the neighbor’s strategy. The neighboring degree between a supervisor
and its neighbor is related to the correlation of two groups of subordinates
they supervise. A higher neighboring degree means the greater probability of
choosing this neighboring supervisor. The motivation of imitating peers comes
from evolutionary game theory [31], which provides a powerful methodology
to model how strategies evolve over time based on their relative performance.
One of the widely used imitation rules is the proportional imitation [20], which
is adopted here as shown in Equation (8),
p =
1
1 + e−β∗(FMQj(s,a)−FMQi(s,a))
(8)
where the parameter β controls the each supervisor i’s degree of imitating the
strategy (the FMQ-value) of the neighboring supervisor j.
Finally each supervisor i updates its strategy (denoted as E-value Ei(s, a))
for each action a under state s as the average between the FMQ-values of its
own and its neighbor j weighted by parameter p. Formally we have,
Ei(s, a) = (1− p) ∗ FMQi(s, a) + p ∗ FMQj(s, a) (9)
3.4.2 Supervisor Instruction Generation
Next we introduce how a supervisor generates instructions for its subordinates
at the end of each round. As previously mentioned, there are two forms of
instructions from a supervisor: rules and suggestions. First each supervisor i
normalizes the E-values, which serves as the basis for generating instructions
for its subordinates. Formally we have,
E′i(s, a) =
Ei(s, a)− Ei(s)
σ
(10)
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where Ei(s) is the mean of E-values averaged over all action estimates in state
s and as shown in Equation (11),
Ei(s) =
∑
a∈AEi(s, a)
|A|
(11)
The parameter σ is the standard deviation of FMQ-value following Equation
(12),
σ =
√
1
|A|
∑
a∈A
(Ei(s, a)− Ei(s, a))2 (12)
Given a state-action pair 〈s, a〉, if the E′-value E′(s, a) is smaller than a
given threshold, it indicates that selecting action a is not a wise choice under
state s, thus it is encoded as a rule. Formally we have,
F = {〈s, a〉|E′(s, a) < δ} (13)
where δ is the threshold which is set to the value of -0.5 in this paper.
For each state-action pair (s, a), its recommendation degree d(s, a) is set
to the value of E′i(s, a). Thus the set of suggestions from supervisor i can be
represented as follows,
D = {〈s, a, E′i(s, a)〉 | a ∈ A, s ∈ S} (14)
Given a state-action pair (s, a), if E′i(s, a) < 0, it indicates that selecting action
a is not recommended under state s; if E′i(s, a) > 0, it indicates subordinate
agents are encouraged to select action a when they are in state s.
3.4.3 Learning Strategy of Subordinates
Similar to the strategies of supervisors, each subordinate agent j also keeps a
record of a Q-value Qj(s, a) for each action a ∈ Aj under each state s. The
Q-value Qj(s, a) indicates the past performance of choosing action a under
state s and serves as the basis for making decisions [3]. For each subordinate
agent j, let us first denote its feedback information received by the end of
round t as FeedInf tj = {〈sm, am, rm〉|m ∈ [1, t]}. At the end of each round
t, subordinate agent j updates its Q-value based on its feedback 〈st, at, rt〉 as
follows,
Qj(st, at) = (1− αj) ∗Qj(st, at) + αj ∗ rt (15)
where αj is the learning rate modelling its updating degree between using the
previous experience and using the most recent information.
Additionally, each subordinate agent also updates its Q-values by taking
into consideration both the optimistic assumption and the frequency informa-
tion [13]. Formally we have,
FMQj(s, a) = Qj(s, a) + freq(s, a) ∗ rmax(s, a) ∗ C (16)
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where rmax(s, a) is the max reward of each action a based on its own experi-
ence, freq(s, a) is the frequency of getting the payoff of rmax(s, a) until now
for action a and C is a weighting factor defining the trade-off between updat-
ing using Q-values and maximum payoff information. freq(s, a) is calculated
the same as shown in Equation (3).
After receiving supervisor’s suggestions, each subordinate further adjusts
its estimation of the goodness of each state-action pair based on the FMQ-
values as follows,
Ej(s, a) = FMQj(s, a) ∗ (1 + d(s, a) ∗ ρ) (17)
where d(s, a) is the suggestion degree on the state-action pair (s, a), and ρ is
a weighting factor controlling the influence of the recommendation degree on
the E-values.
Besides, supervisors also influence the subordinate agents’ exploration rates.
Let us suppose a subordinate agent j selects action a under current state s. If
the supervisor i’s recommendation degree d(s, a) < 0, which indicates subordi-
nate agent j’s current choice is not recommended, and agent j should increase
the exploration rate to have more chance to select the recommended actions
next time. On the other hand, if the recommendation degree d(s, a) > 0, it
indicates the subordinates’ current choice is recommended. Thus subordinate
agent j decreases its exploration rate to avoid selecting discouraging actions in
the future. For both cases, the adjustment degree varies depending on the ab-
solute value of the state-action pair’s recommendation degree. Formally each
subordinate agent updates its exploration rate as follows,
ǫj = ǫj ∗ (1− d(s, a) ∗ γ) (18)
where γ is a weighting factor controlling the influence degree of the supervisor’s
suggestion on the subordinates’ exploration rates.
Finally, given the current state s, each subordinate agent j chooses its
action from those actions whose corresponding state-action pair do not belong
to the set F of rules based on the corresponding set of E-values according to
the ǫ-greedy mechanism. The probability πj(s, a) for choosing action a under
state s is defined in Equation 19. Specifically, each agent chooses its action
with the highest E-value with probability 1 − ǫj to exploit the action with
best performance currently (random selection in case of a tie), and makes
random choices with probability ǫj to explore new actions with potentially
better performance.
πj(s, a) =


1− ǫj if a = argmaxa′E(s, a
′
)
0 if a ∈ Fj
ǫj
|Aj|−|Fj |−1
otherwise
(19)
4 Experimental Simulation
In this section, we start with evaluating the norm emergence performance of
our approach HHLS under different types of games by comparing with the
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Table 4 The initial value of parameters.
Parameters α ǫ β γ ρ d
Value 0.99 0.93 0.1 0.05 0.01 6
Table 5 The explanations of parameters.
Parameters Explanations
α Learning rate
ǫ ǫ-greedy probability
β Weighting factor on supervisors’ interaction
γ Weighting factor on subordinates’ exploration rates
ρ Weighting factor on subordinates’ E-Value
d Average connection degree of small-world and scale-free network
state-of-the-art strategies. Following that we explore the influence of some key
parameters on norm emergence. We use degree grouping in the following ex-
perimental simulations, and the influence of different grouping mechanisms are
investigated in Section 4.3. All results are averaged over 1000 runs. The param-
eter settings and explanations are shown in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
4.1 Performance Evaluation in Different Games
We compare our approach HHLS with two previous works: hierarchical learn-
ing in [35] and social learning in [3]. All these three learning approaches are
within the same social learning environment, i.e., each agent is allowed to
interact with only one of its neighbors each round. The work in [3] is the
representative state-of-the-art approach tackling norm emergence problem un-
der multiagent social learning framework without considering any hierarchical
organization. The work in [35] is the most recent approach introducing hier-
archical learning into multiagent social learning framework to improve norm
emergence efficiency. Four representative 6-action games are considered shown
from Table 6 to Table 9.
4.1.1 Coordination Game (CG)
We first consider agents playing a 6-action coordination game (Table 6) in
which there exist six norms marked with red. Agents are preferred to choose the
same action. Fig 2 shows the dynamics of the average payoffs of agents with the
number of rounds averaged for the three learning approaches. We can observe
that all learning methods enable agents to achieve an average payoff of 1. Our
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Table 6 The payoff matrix of coordination game.
Agent 2’s actions
a b c d e f
Agent 1’s
actions
a 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
b -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
c -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
d -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1
e -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
f -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
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Fig. 2 The dynamics of the average pay-
offs of agents in coordination games under
different strategies.
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Fig. 3 The dynamics of the average payoffs
of agents in anti-coordination games under
different strategies.
hierarchically heuristic learning strategy converges faster than the hierarchical
learning method [35], and the social learning method [3] is the slowest. This is
because HHLS enables the supervisor agents to influence subordinate agents
in a more efficient manner, thus accelerating norm emergence.
4.1.2 Anti-coordination Game (ACG)
Similarly, we consider agents playing a 6-action anti-coordination game (Ta-
ble 7) in which there also exist six equivalently optimal norms marked with
red. However, different from coordination game, each norm requires agents to
choose different actions. Fig 3 shows the dynamics of the average payoffs us-
ing three learning methods. We can observe that both social learning [3] and
HHLS enable agents to achieve an average payoff of 1, while the hierarchical
learning fails. Besides, our HHLS converge faster than the social learning ap-
proach [3], which justifies the efficiency of introducing a hierarchical learning
structure. For the hierarchical learning [35], it does not distinguish the state
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Table 7 The payoff matrix of anti-coordination game.
Agent 2’s actions
a b c d e f
Agent 1’s
actions
a -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 1
b -1 -1 -1 -1 1 -1
c -1 -1 -1 1 -1 -1
d -1 -1 1 -1 -1 -1
e -1 1 -1 -1 -1 -1
f 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1
Table 8 The payoff matrix of coordination game with high penalty.
Agent 2’s actions
a b c d e f
Agent 1’s
actions
a 10 0 -30 -30 0 -30
b 0 7 0 0 0 0
c -30 0 10 -30 0 -30
d -30 0 -30 10 0 -30
e 0 0 0 0 7 0
f -30 0 -30 -30 0 10
information and thus cannot adaptively select different actions for different
states.
4.1.3 Coordination Game with High Penalty (CGHP)
Next, we consider 100 agents playing a 6-action coordination game with high
penalty (Table 8), in which there exist four optimal norms marked with red
and two suboptimal norms marked with blue. In this kind of games, agents
are vulnerable to converge to suboptimal norms due to the existence of high
mis-coordination cost (-30). Fig 4 shows the dynamics of the average payoffs
of agents with the number of rounds for the three learning approaches. We
can see that only HHLS enables agents to achieve an average payoff of 10 (i.e.,
converging to one optimal norm). The other two learning methods converge
to one of the suboptimal norms, and they also converge slower than HHLS.
We hypothesize the superior performance of HHLS is due to the integration of
optimistic assumption during strategy update (to overcome mis-coordination
cost effect) and efficient hierarchical supervision (to accelerate norm emergence
speed).
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4.1.4 Fully Stochastic Coordination Game with High Penalty (FSCGHP)
Last, we consider agents playing a 6-action fully stochastic coordination game
with high penalty (Table 9). In FSCGHP, each outcome is associated with
two possible payoffs and the agents receive one of them with probability 0.5,
which models the uncertainty of the interaction results. The expected payoffs
of this game are the same with the CGHP and there also exist four optimal
norms marked with red and two suboptimal norms marked with blue. But
it is more complex and difficult to emerge norms due to the stochasticity of
the environments. Fig 5 shows the dynamics of the average payoffs of agents
against the number of rounds for the three learning strategies. We can observe
that in this challenging game, only HHLS enables agents to achieve an average
payoff of 10 (agents learn to converge to one optimal). In contrast, the other
two learning strategies converge to one of the suboptimal norms with a slower
convergence rate. Finally, it is worth mentioning that if the size of the action,
and norm space is further increased, the social learning method [3] and hier-
archical learning method [35] cannot converge (to a suboptimal norm) within
10000 runs. However, HHLS still can support converging to one optimal norm
within approximately 200 rounds. The influence of action size will be discussed
in more detail in Section 4.4.2.
4.2 Influence of Different Components of HHLS
Next, to justify the importance of the key components (optimistic assumption
and supervisor’s guidance) in our HHLS framework, we further investigate the
relative importance of different modified versions of HHLS mechanisms: HHLS,
HHLS without optimistic assumption (i.e., HHLS without FMQ heuristic),
HHLS without Supervisors’ guidance (i.e., HHLS without hierarchical struc-
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Table 9 The payoff matrix of fully stochastic coordination game with high penalty.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
a b c d e f
Agent 1’s
actions
a 12/8 5/-5 -20/-40 -20/-40 5/-5 -20/-40
b 5/-5 14/0 5/-5 5/-5 5/-5 5/-5
c -20/-40 5/-5 12/8 -20/-40 5/-5 -20/-40
d -20/-40 5/-5 -20/-40 12/8 5/-5 -20/-40
e 5/-5 5/-5 5/-5 5/-5 14/0 5/-5
f -20/-40 5/-5 -20/-40 -20/-40 5/-5 12/8
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Fig. 6 The dynamics of the average pay-
offs of agents in 3-action CGHP under dif-
ferent HHLS mechanisms.
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Fig. 7 The dynamics of the average pay-
offs of agents in 6-action CGHP under dif-
ferent strategies.
ture). We use coordination game with high penalty (CGHP) as an illustrating
example and the results are similar under other matrix games.
Fig 6 shows the different average payoffs under three different HHLS mech-
anisms for a small-size CGHP with 3 actions. We can see that HHLS without
optimistic assumption or without supervisors’ guidance still enables agents to
converge to an optimal norm. However, the convergence rate under these two
mechanisms is much slower than the full HHLS mechanism. Next, we consider
increasing the game size to 6 actions and the results are given in Fig 7. We
can see that only the full HHLS mechanism can enable fast convergence to the
optimal norm while the other two approaches fail. These results confirm the
hypothesis proposed in Section 4.1.3 that both components are critical and the
integration of the two components leads to superior performance of HHLS.
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4.3 Performance of Different Grouping Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate the performance of norm emergence using dif-
ferent grouping mechanisms described above in Section 3.2.
Fig 8 shows the influence of different grouping mechanisms on the per-
formance of norm emergence. The results are averaged over 1000 iterations
in 3-action coordination game with high penalty with a population of 100
agents. We can see that all these grouping mechanisms enable efficient norm
emergence while degree grouping outperforms the rest of three grouping mech-
anisms. The slight differences among these grouping mechanisms prove to be
statistically significant under t-test.
Intuitively, those subordinate agents with higher degrees play a more im-
portant role in the whole population because they can influence more neigh-
boring agents. Degree grouping allocates agents with the same degree into the
same group. For more important agents (with higher degree), they can reach a
unified opinion more quickly, and in turn influence the rest of agents of lower
degrees to quicker convergence.
4.4 Influence of Non-hierarchical Parameters
In this section, we investigate the influence of key parameters on the perfor-
mance of norm emergence. We present the following results for hierarchically
heuristic learning using a small-world network. Except the parameter whose
effect is being investigated, the rest of parameters follow the same settings as
in Section 4.
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4.4.1 Influence of Population Size
The influence of population size is shown in Fig 9. For a 6-action coordination
game with high penalty (CGHP), we can clearly observe the norm emergence
efficiency is reduced with the increase of the population size. As the size of
clusters is held constant, the number of clusters increase as the population
size becomes larger. We hypothesize that the increase of clusters impede effi-
cient coordination among agents in the hierarchical framework in the following
two ways. First, the coordination efforts required among cluster supervisors
increase significantly with the number of clusters. Second, the increase of clus-
ters also add difficulty to the efficient guidance of each supervisor to generate
suggestions to guide all of their subordinate agents towards a consistent norm.
4.4.2 Influence of Action Size
Fig 10 shows the dynamics of the average payoffs of agents for different action
sizes on the 6-action coordination game with high penalty (CGHP). We can
see that the convergence rate decreases with increase in the size of the action
space. This is expected because the coordination space becomes larger when
the action size increases. Besides, larger action size usually results in more
chances of mis-coordination cost and suboptimal norms, which additionally
increases the coordination difficulty for agents selecting a consistent norm.
Finally, it is worth noting that with the increase in the action space size, our
framework can still efficiently support norm emergence without significantly
degrading the performance (norm emergence occurs within 1000 rounds for all
cases). In contrast, in previous socially learning framework without utilizing
a hierarchical organization [3], the norm convergence speed is significantly
reduced when the action space is increased.
22 Tianpei Yang et al.
Table 10 The average number of rounds needed before convergence under different network
topologies.
Convergence
Speed
Game type
CG ACG CGHP FSCGHP
Network
topology
Grid 142 141 131 153
Ring 144 146 135 157
Random 146 136 122 162
Small-world 141 141 124 162
Scale-free 149 144 129 163
Table 11 The influence of neighborhood size.
Neighbor
size 2 6 8 10 20 30 50 99
Convergence
Rate 144 141 143 139 141 141 142 139
4.4.3 Influence of Network Topology
We evaluate the influence of five different networks: random network, grid
network, ring network, small-world and scale-free network on the 6-action
coordination game with high penalty (CGHP). Table 10 shows the average
number of rounds needed before convergence. We find that hierarchical so-
cial learning framework performs robustly under different network topologies.
HHLS enables agents to converge to norms in approximately the same number
of rounds under all the above five network topologies for the different game
types we have experimented with.
4.4.4 Influence of Neighborhood Size
We empirically evaluate the influence of neighborhood size varying it from 2
up to 99 (fully connected) with a population of 100 agents on the 6-action
coordination game with high penalty (CGHP). Table 11 shows the average
number of rounds needed before convergence for different neighborhood sizes.
We can see that the average number of rounds required stabilizes at around
140 rounds. This finding is different from the results usually observed in the
traditional socially learning framework without a hierarchical structure [3].
This is because in hierarchical social learning framework, each supervisor su-
pervises and guides a cluster of subordinate agents, which can overcome the
low connectivity disadvantage when the neighborhood size is small.
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4.5 Influence of Hierarchical Factors
4.5.1 Influence of Cluster Size
One unique feature of the hierarchical social learning framework is the division
of clusters of agents. Fig 11 and 12 show the influence of cluster size on norm
emergence with a population of 100 agents on the 6-action coordination game
with high penalty (CGHP). From Fig 11, we can see that the norm emergence
rate is gradually increased with the increase of cluster sizes, and stabilizes when
the cluster size crosses 15. This phenomenon can be observed more clearly in
Fig 12, which shows the average number of rounds needed before convergence
is reduced with the increase of cluster size and stabilizes around 100 rounds.
When the cluster size is increased to 100 in the extreme case, it is essentially
reduced to centralized control in which only one supervisor agent supervises
all the rest of agents. In this case, all the communication and computation
burden would fall on this single supervisor agent. When the cluster size is 1,
it is essentially equivalent with the case of the traditional social learning with-
out a hierarchical structure. When the cluster size varies between 1 and 100,
with the increase of the cluster size, each supervisor agent can supervise more
subordinate agents and thus it is easier for agents to coordinate among each
other. However, as the cluster size exceeds certain threshold, the advantage of
centralized supervision diminishes. This property is desirable since the same
level performance as fully centralized supervision can be achieved under dis-
tributed supervision, which not only increases the robustness of the HHLS and
the framework itself but reduces the communication and computation burden
of supervisor agents.
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4.5.2 Influence of The Number of Disabling Supervisors
Next we further examine the robustness of HHLS in details by investigating
the following questions: whether a consistent norm can still rapidly emerge
and how is the emergence efficiency changed when a number of supervisors is
disabled? Fig 13 shows the dynamics of expected payoffs of agents with some
supervisors disabled, and the results are averaged over 6-action coordination
game with high penalty. We can see that hierarchically heuristic learning still
enables agents to converge to a consistent norm when some of the supervisors
is disabled. Though the convergence rate is gradually decreased with increased
in the number of disabled supervisors, better performance than the traditional
social learning framework can still be achieved. This is expected since those
subordinate agents without supervisors can only learn based on their local
information, and the hierarchical social learning framework would be reduced
to the traditional social learning framework when all supervisors are disabled.
4.6 Fixed-strategy Agents on Norm Emergence
In this section, we investigate the extraneous effects of norm emergence. Specif-
ically, we consider injecting a small number of agents with a fixed-strategy, and
study the influence of those fixed-strategy agents on the population’s norm
emergence. We compare the influence of fixed-strategy agents on HHLS with
that on other learning strategies in previous work. Besides, we investigate the
influence of different placement strategies of fixed-strategy agents on the con-
vergence rate. For random networks, the location of each fixed-strategy agent is
randomly selected. For other network topologies, the location of placing fixed-
strategy agents could be critical in influencing the norm emergence in agent
societies. We also consider the influence of late intervention and the influence
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Fig. 15 The influence of fixed-strategy
agents on norm emergence.
of placing fixed-strategy agents on different levels within our hierarchical social
learning framework.
4.6.1 Influence of Fixed-strategy Agents on Norm Adoption
When all agents are employing HHLS under the hierarchical social learning
framework, for a 2-action coordination game, it can be observed that both
norms ((a, a) and (b, b)) can be achieved with the same frequency over multiple
runs as shown in Fig 14. This is understandable because the game itself is
symmetric and the agents do not have any preference towards either of the
two norms.
In contrast, Fig 15 shows the frequency of the two norms being evolved
when the number of agents playing the fixed-strategy b is increased gradu-
ally. Initially both norms ((a, a) and (b, b)) are evolved with roughly equal
frequency. As the number of fixed-strategy agents increases, the frequency of
evolving norm (b,b) gradually increases towards 1. This indicates that small
amount of agents, using a fixed and deterministic strategy, can have significant
influence on the overall population’s norm emergence direction.
4.6.2 Comparison with Previous Works
Regarding the influence of fixed-strategy agent on norm adoption, we also
compare our HHLS with social learning [3] and hierarchical learning [35]. For
HHLS and hierarchical learning [35], all fixed-strategy agents are inserted into
groups of subordinate agents randomly. Fig 16 shows the dynamics of the fre-
quency of norm (b,b) emerging in 2-action coordination game as the number
of fixed-strategy agents increases. The coordination game is symmetric: both
norms ((a, a) and (b, b)) can be achieved with the same frequency. However,
we see that hierarchical learning [35] shows a slight bias towards norm (a,a)
initially. Given the same number of fixed-strategy agents, agents are more
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inclined to learn the norm played by fixed-strategy agents under the social
learning framework [3] than HHLS and hierarchical learning [35]. This is be-
cause a hierarchical structure weakens the influence between subordinates and
their neighbors through the supervisor’s guidance.
4.6.3 Influence of the Placement Strategies of Fixed-strategy Agents
Previous sections investigate the effects of fixed-strategy agents which are
randomly distributed in the population. Next we consider the influence of
fixed-strategy agent placement strategies on the norm emergence rate. We
are interested in investigating whether placing fixed-strategy agents following
appropriate heuristics can decrease the convergence time.
We consider the following commonly used placement metrics: degree (DC),
betweenness (BC), closeness (CC) and eigenvector (EC) centrality heuristics.
These metrics quantify the structural properties of the underlying network and
previous work has shown these placement heuristics have better efficacy than
random placement [16,6,10]. The DC of an agent is defined as the numbers of
its neighbors. An agent with a higher DC means it can influence more agents
directly in a network. The BC of an agent measures the number of the shortest
paths in the network between other agents that pass through it. An agent with
higher BC can manipulate the information flow more effectively in a network.
The core idea of CC is that an agent is closeness central if it can interact
all other agents easily. The closeness centrality of an agent located at a node
is calculated using the average shortest path between the node and all other
nodes. The EC of an agent is related to the connections of its neighbors. An
agent has a higher EC if its neighbors has more connections with other agents.
This measure takes into account both direct and indirect connections between
agents. EC is calculated using the eigenvector of the largest eigenvalue given
by the adjacency matrix representing the network.
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Fig 17 shows the influence of placing fixed-strategy agents following the
above placement metrics on convergence rate. Random placement is also con-
sidered as the baseline strategy. First we can see that the average convergence
time is gradually decreased with the increase of the number of fixed strategy
agents. Besides, BC, CC, DC and EC placement strategies outperform random
placement. Intuitively fixed strategy agents located in nodes with higher cen-
trality values can influence the whole population more quickly and widely, thus
significantly reducing the convergence time compared with random placement.
The performance difference between BC, CC, DC and EC is insignificant for
scale-free network. This is due to the reason that almost the same set of agents
are selected by these metrics in scale-free network since the values of Pearson’s
Correlation between these metrics are very high (approximately 0.9).
4.6.4 Late Intervention
We have analyzed the influence of fixed-strategy agents on norm emergence
where we place fixed-strategy agents at the beginning of the population in-
teraction. Now we consider an alternative form of intervention, late interven-
tion, i.e., inserting some number of fixed-strategy agents when a norm already
emerges among the population, to investigate the robustness of our algorithm.
We first allow all agents to employ HHLS without fixed-strategy agents being
inserted. For a 3-action coordination game with high penalty (CGHP) pre-
sented in Table 12, when the whole population has already converged to one
of the optimal norms (e.g. norm (a,a)), we inject a small number of agents
playing a fixed-strategy c. We expect these fixed-strategy agents to be able to
influence the whole population to change to norm (c,c).
Fig 18 shows the influence of small number of fixed-strategy agents on
replacing an existing norm with the 3-action coordination game with high
penalty (CGHP). There exist two norms in CGHP and we can see that the
whole population of 100 agents first converges to norm (a,a) without fixed-
strategy agents at approximately the 190th time step. After this, we manually
replace the top 20 agents with the highest EC values with fixed-strategy agents
playing action c. We can see that the rest of agents are gradually incentivized
to adopt strategy c and the whole population finally converges to norm (c,c)
at approximately the 450th time step.
We further investigate the influence of late intervention using fixed-strategy
agents on influencing an existing norm under different game sizes. The results
are shown in Fig 19, which are averaged over 100 runs. We can see that for a
2-action coordination game, the frequency of norm (b,b) gradually increases
towards 1 when the number of fixed-strategy agents is larger than 50. Com-
pared with the results on initial intervention shown in Section 4.6.1, we can see
that late intervention needs a larger number of fixed-strategy agents to change
the whole population’s norm emergence direction. Another observation is that
as the action space increases, late intervention of fixed-strategy agents fails to
influence the whole population. This phenomenon indicates that the emerged
norm becomes more stable with the increase of action space, in which late
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Table 12 Coordination game with high penalty.
1’s payoff
2’s payoff
Agent 2’s actions
a b c
Agent 1’s
actions
a 10 0 -30
b 0 7 0
c -30 0 10
Fig. 18 The influence of late intervention
of fixed-strategy agents on norm emergence.
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Fig. 19 The influence of late intervention
of fixed-strategy agents on norm emer-
gence under different action sizes.
intervention may not exert any influence on norm emergence when the action
space is sufficiently large.
4.6.5 Influence of Fixed-strategy Agents in Different Levels of the
Hierarchical Framework
Finally, we investigate the influence of the location of fixed-strategy agents
when they are placed in different levels (i.e. supervisor level and subordinate
level) of the hierarchical learning framework. Fig 20 shows the influence of the
locations of fixed-strategy agents when they are placed in different levels given
a 2-action coordination game. The whole population of 500 agents are divided
into 20 groups using degree grouping. We can see that placing fixed-strategy
agents in the supervisor level influences the whole population more quickly
than placing fixed-strategy agents in the subordinate level. The result is rea-
sonable because supervisors play a more important role than subordinates in
the system. In addition to interacting with their neighbors as ordinary subor-
dinate agents, supervisors collect all subordinates’ information and generate
recommendations for subordinates. With a number of supervisors playing a
fixed-strategy, they can not only can influence their neighbors through inter-
actions, but can pass their influence directly down to the group of subordinate
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Fig. 21 Norm emergence in isolated sub-
networks.
agents they supervise through recommendations. Therefore, the whole system
is more responsive towards the influence of fixed-strategy supervisor agents.
4.7 Norm Emergence in Isolated Sub-networks
In human societies, isolated populations can use contradictory norms, e.g.,
driving on the “right” or the “wrong” side of the road. When the frequency
of interaction between the groups is quite small, a different norm can emerge
in each group. To this end, we investigate the degree of isolation required for
divergent norms to emerge in each group.
We consider two groups of equal number of 100 agents and agents from
one group interact with agents from the other group with certain probability.
Results are presented in Fig 21. We observe that when the probability of
interaction is higher than 0.2, a single norm pervades the entire population.
In roughly half of the runs all agents learn to norm (a, a) and the other half
of the runs, agents learn towards norm (b, b). However, when the probability
of interaction becomes less than 0.2, there are runs where divergent norms
emerge in two groups. It indicates that a higher interaction frequency between
two isolated populations could sustain a consistent norm emergence for the
whole system.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We propose a hierarchically heuristic learning strategy to ensure efficient norm
emergence in different distributed multiagent environments with various inter-
action topologies and several interaction scenarios (games). Extensive simula-
tion shows that the proposed HHLS strategy can enable agents to reach con-
sistent norms more efficiently and in a wider variety of games compared with
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previous approaches.We introduce different kinds of grouping mechanisms into
our framework and evaluate the performance of these grouping mechanisms
on norm emergence. The influence of different key non-hierarchical parameters
(e.g., population size, action space, neighborhood size and network topology)
are also investigated.
We also evaluate the influence of centralized and decentralized hierarchi-
cally design by examining the effects of different cluster sizes (e.g., different
number of supervisors). We find that certain degree of distributed supervision
(a number of supervisors) can achieve the same performance as fully cen-
tralized supervision (only one supervisor), and thus make the HHLS robust
towards the failure of certain supervisors. Moreover, we investigate the dif-
ferent components of the HHLS scheme and study the effect of the relative
importance of those components. The results confirm that both components
are critical and the integration of the two components leads to superior perfor-
mance of HHLS. Furthermore, the influence of fixed-strategy agents on norm
emergence are extensively investigated from different aspects and valuable
insights are revealed (e.g., initial and late intervention, different placement
strategies, fixed-strategy agents in different levels of the hierarchical struc-
ture). Lastly, we investigate the norm emergence in isolated population and
experiments show that different norms emerge in isolated groups and a higher
interaction frequency between isolated populations could sustain a consistent
norm emergence for the whole system.
As future work, it is worthwhile investigating how to extend HHLS to
multi-level hierarchical structures and how to design different communication
and negotiation mechanisms between supervisors to accelerate norm emer-
gence in larger action and agent spaces. Another worthwhile direction is to
further investigate the influence of fixed-strategy agents in different ways, e.g.,
late intervention with some number of agents randomly selecting actions in
contrast to fixed-strategy agents, mixing times between populations starting
with different norms.
Acknowledgements This work is partially supported by the subproject of the National
Key Technology R&D Program of China (No.: 2015BAH52F01-1), National Natural Science
Foundation of China (No.: 61304262, 61502072) and Tianjin Research Program of Applica-
tion Foundation and Advanced Technology (No.: 16JCQNJC00100).
References
1. Abdoos, M., Mozayani, N., Bazzan, A.L.: Holonic multi-agent system for traffic signals
control. Engineering Applications of Artificial Intelligence 26(5), 1575–1587 (2013)
2. A˚gotnes, T., Wooldridge, M.: Optimal social laws. In: 9th International Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), Toronto, Canada, May
10-14, 2010, Volume 1-3, pp. 667–674 (2010)
3. Airiau, S., Sen, S., Villatoro, D.: Emergence of conventions through social learning.
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 28(5), 779–804 (2014)
4. Bianchi, R.A., Ribeiro, C.H., Costa, A.H.R.: Heuristic selection of actions in multiagent
reinforcement learning. In: IJCAI 2007, Proceedings of the 20th International Joint
Hierarchical Heuristic Learning towards Efficient Norm Emergence 31
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Hyderabad, India, January 6-12, 2007, pp. 690–
695 (2007)
5. Franks, H., Griffiths, N., Anand, S.S.: Learning agent influence in mas with complex
social networks. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 28(5), 836–866 (2014)
6. Franks, H., Griffiths, N., Jhumka, A.: Manipulating convention emergence using influ-
encer agents. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 26(3), 315–353 (2013)
7. Genter, K., Stone, P.: Adding influencing agents to a flock. In: Proceedings of the 2016
International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, Singapore,
May 9-13, 2016, pp. 615–623 (2016)
8. Genter, K., Stone, P.: Agent behaviors for joining and leaving a flock. In: Proceedings of
the 16th Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2017,
Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, May 8-12, 2017, pp. 1553–1555 (2017)
9. Genter, K., Zhang, S., Stone, P.: Determining placements of influencing agents in a
flock. In: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems, pp. 247–255 (2015)
10. Griffiths, N., Anand, S.S.: The impact of social placement of non-learning agents on
convention emergence. In: Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 3, pp. 1367–1368 (2012)
11. Hao, J., Leung, H.f.: The dynamics of reinforcement social learning in cooperative mul-
tiagent systems. In: IJCAI 2013, Proceedings of the 23rd International Joint Conference
on Artificial Intelligence, Beijing, China, August 3-9, 2013, vol. 13, pp. 184–190 (2013)
12. Hao, J., Sun, J., Huang, D., Cai, Y., Yu, C.: Heuristic collective learning for efficient and
robust emergence of social norms. In: Proceedings of the 2015 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2015, Istanbul, Turkey, May
4-8, 2015, pp. 1647–1648 (2015)
13. Kapetanakis, S., Kudenko, D.: Reinforcement learning of coordination in heterogeneous
cooperative multi-agent systems. In: Adaptive Agents and Multi-Agent Systems II:
Adaptation and Multi-Agent Learning, pp. 119–131 (2005)
14. Kernighan, B.W., Lin, S.: An efficient heuristic procedure for partitioning graphs. Bell
system technical journal 49(2), 291–307 (1970)
15. MacQueen, J., et al.: Some methods for classification and analysis of multivariate ob-
servations. In: Proceedings of the fifth Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics
and probability, pp. 281–297 (1967)
16. Marchant, J., Griffiths, N., Leeke, M.: Manipulating conventions in a particle-based
topology. In: Proceedings of the Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms
in Agent Systems Workshop (2015)
17. Mihaylov, M., Tuyls, K., Nowe´, A.: A decentralized approach for convention emergence
in multi-agent systems. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 28(5), 749–778
(2014)
18. Miralles, J.C., Esteva, M., Lo´pez-Sa´nchez, M., Morales, J., Salamo´, M.: Organisational
adaptation of multi-agent systems in a peer-to-peer scenario. Computing 91(2), 169–215
(2011)
19. Mukherjee, P., Sen, S., Airiau, S.: Norm emergence under constrained interactions in
diverse societies. In: 7th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2008), Estoril, Portugal, May 12-16, 2008, Volume 2, pp.
779–786 (2008)
20. Pacheco, J.M., Traulsen, A., Nowak, M.A.: Coevolution of strategy and structure in
complex networks with dynamical linking. Physical Review Letters 97(25), 258,103
(2006)
21. Savarimuthu, B.T.R., Arulanandam, R., Purvis, M.: Aspects of active norm learning
and the effect of lying on norm emergence in agent societies. In: Agents in Principle,
Agents in Practice, pp. 36–50. Springer (2011)
22. Sen, O., Sen, S.: Effects of social network topology and options on norm emergence.
In: Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V, COIN
2009 International Workshops. COIN@AAMAS 2009, Budapest, Hungary, May 2009,
COIN@IJCAI 2009, Pasadena, USA, July 2009, COIN@MALLOW 2009, Turin, Italy,
September 2009. Revised Selected Papers, pp. 211–222 (2009)
32 Tianpei Yang et al.
23. Sen, O., Sen, S.: Effects of social network topology and options on norm emergence. In:
Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V, pp. 211–222.
Springer (2010)
24. Sen, S., Airiau, S.: Emergence of norms through social learning. In: International Joint
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 1507, p. 1512 (2007)
25. Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: On the emergence of social conventions: modeling, anal-
ysis, and simulations. Artificial Intelligence 94(1), 139–166 (1997)
26. Terroine, E.F., Lvy, M.: Automated synthesis of normative systems. In: Proceedings of
the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and Multiagent systems, pp.
109–116 (2013)
27. Tiwari, R., Jain, P., Butail, S., Baliyarasimhuni, S.P., Goodrich, M.A.: Effect of leader
placement on robotic swarm control. In: Proceedings of the 16th Conference on Au-
tonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems, AAMAS 2017, Sa˜o Paulo, Brazil, May 8-12,
2017, pp. 1387–1394 (2017)
28. Villatoro, D., Sabater-Mir, J., Sen, S.: Social instruments for robust convention emer-
gence. In: International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, vol. 11, pp. 420–425
(2011)
29. Villatoro, D., Sabater-Mir, J., Sen, S.: Robust convention emergence in social networks
through self-reinforcing structures dissolution. ACM Transactions on Autonomous and
Adaptive Systems (TAAS) 8(1), 2 (2013)
30. Villatoro, D., Sen, S., Sabater-Mir, J.: Topology and memory effect on convention emer-
gence. In: Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conference on
Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology-Volume 02, pp. 233–240. IEEE Com-
puter Society (2009)
31. Weibull, J.W.: Evolutionary game theory. MIT press (1997)
32. Yang, T., Meng, Z., Hao, J., Sen, S., Yu, C.: Accelerating norm emergence through
hierarchical heuristic learning. In: ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, 29 August-2 September 2016, The Hague, The Netherlands - Including
Prestigious Applications of Artificial Intelligence (PAIS 2016), pp. 1344–1352 (2016)
33. Ye, D., Zhang, M., Sutanto, D.: A hybrid multiagent framework with q-learning for
power grid systems restoration. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 26(4), 2434–
2441 (2011)
34. Young, H.P.: The economics of convention. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(2),
105–122 (1996)
35. Yu, C., Lv, H., Ren, F., Bao, H., Hao, J.: Hierarchical learning for emergence of social
norms in networked multiagent systems. In: AI 2015: Advances in Artificial Intelligence,
pp. 630–643. Springer (2015)
36. Yu, C., Lv, H., Sen, S., Hao, J., Ren, F., Liu, R.: An adaptive learning framework for
efficient emergence of social norms. In: Proceedings of the 2016 International Conference
on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems, pp. 1307–1308 (2016)
37. Yu, C., Tan, G., Lv, H., Wang, Z., Meng, J., Hao, J., Ren, F.: Modelling adaptive
learning behaviours for consensus formation in human societies. Scientific reports 6
(2016)
38. Yu, C., Zhang, M., Ren, F., Luo, X.: Emergence of social norms through collective learn-
ing in networked agent societies. In: Proceedings of the 2013 international conference
on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems, pp. 475–482 (2013)
39. Zhang, C., Abdallah, S., Lesser, V.: Integrating organizational control into multi-agent
learning. In: Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents
and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2, pp. 757–764 (2009)
40. Zhang, C., Lesser, V., Abdallah, S.: Self-organization for coordinating decentralized
reinforcement learning. In: 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and
Multiagent Systems (AAMAS 2010), Toronto, Canada, May 10-14, 2010, Volume 1-3,
pp. 739–746 (2010)
